bmwkraftur.is

http://visir.is/article/20081013/FRETTIR01/578332794/-1

Hvað finnst ykkur um þetta ef rétt reynist? Þ.e.a.s. ef að þeir sem hafa í kæruleysinu átt fleiri fleiri bíla á háum lánum, geti nú bara selt þá úr landi (fyrir €) og fengið virðisaukann endurgreiddann?

"Fear disturbs your concentration."

No matter – when foreign short-run credit lines closed, Glitnir had to request a short-term loan from the Central Bank of Iceland, which refused. Rather than taking Glitnir into administration, the CBI enforced nationalisation on punitive terms. The governor, David Oddsson, was prime minister for 13 years prior to moving to the CBI in 2005. His decision reflected politics, technical incompetence and ignorance of markets, and his comments thereafter were highly destabilising.

[....]


Kaupthing still seemed viable. But last Tuesday, Mr Oddsson made public remarks that were interpreted to mean that Iceland would not meet its obligations to UK depositors. This was politics for home consumption. So was the UK’s retaliation, with an ill-considered invocation of anti-terror laws to seize the UK assets not only of Landsbanki, but also of Kaupthing. Gordon Brown’s highly aggressive statement was not his best moment of the financial crisis.

[....]

Meanwhile the krona fell to ridiculous lows offshore, while domestic trading of the currency ceased. The CBI then made a further egregious error, the prime minister another. The CBI had mishandled its interest rate policy and the foreign exchange markets since early 2008. On Monday, it announced a currency peg at a rate well above the market. Without effective controls, this was unsustainable, and was abandoned by Tuesday. The prime minister prematurely announced a €4bn ($5bn, £3bn) loan from Russia, but it emerged that negotiations would start only this week. What was meant to restore confidence did the opposite.

[....]

There are further lessons. Politicians should not become central bank governors. Mr Oddsson is part of the problem, not of any solution, and should resign immediately. Allowing partial “euroisation” was a recipe for instability. And Iceland was unable or unwilling to arrange early international support, nor did it wish to call in the International Monetary Fund.

Iceland could now negotiate an IMF programme with conditionality and lending from the Fund. But letting the currency float is likely to be disastrous, even with (or because of) much higher interest rates. They could peg the currency with capital controls. Or they could announce they are entering into negotiations to join the European Union, with a commitment to join the euro. If they do, the eurozone authorities should agree to support a reasonable exchange-rate band.

S85 er vondur mótor þó að hann sé kraftmikill...

Annar vinkill á þessu sem menn mega ekki gleyma er að séu bílarnir
fluttir út þá fæst gjaldeyrir á móti (sem stoppar gjaldeyrisútstreymi í
formi afborgana af lánunum á þessum bílum).

Það er öllum í hag.

Ekkert vit í að vera með allt of mikið af bílum hérna sem ekki er
markaður fyrir ef við getum mögulega komist hjá því.

Þetta er svolítið skondið, völvan síðustu áramót.



„Fjármálakreppa er fram undan á Íslandi, eins og við höfum séð undanfarið, og blaðran er að springa. Það verður hrun á peningamarkaði og það syrtir í álinn hjá fólki aðeins meir en nú er. Við þurfum að ná botninum til að ná jafnvægi aftur. Það verður hrun hjá sumum og nýtt upphaf hjá öðrum ...
... Mikið tap verður hjá stóru fjármálafyrirtækjunum og ýmsar sviptingar og neikvæðar breytingar hjá bönkunum líka. Það á eftir að næða eitthvað um Seðlabankann, ég sé stríð í kringum Davíð og fjármálamenn, mér finnst líka hluti ríkisstjórnar blandast í það.“

Stýrivextir lækkaðir um 3,5%... Það er bara ekki nóg..

http://www.mbl.is/mm/vidskipti/frettir/2008/10/15/styrivextir_laekkadir_um_3_5_prosent/